It’s difficult to look at where the Toronto Maple Leafs are right now and not see the end of an era playing out before us.
Not because of their record. Yes, being 8-9-2 through 18 games puts them five spots away from the bottom of the standings, but it also puts them six points back of the top of the division. The Atlantic is as weak as it’s ever been this year, between teams in varying rebuild stages, the Panthers being decimated by injuries, and whatever is currently happening with the Lightning. There are still a whole variety of standings outcomes available to them, just due to the sheer midness of their surroundings. Should they get into the playoffs, it just takes a few weeks of good fortune to make things go crazy. So in that sense, any outcome is still on the table.
But looking like a team that can take the bull by horns and be expected to contend for a Stanley Cup? That feels like it’s coming to an end.
If we’re being honest, it’s felt that way for a while. The Maple Leafs that burst onto the scene in 2016/17 as a young, offensively gifted collective bolstered by depth pieces remaining from a rebuild feel long gone. A team that was amongst the league’s most exciting and most consistently controlling of play for a solid six or seven seasons feels almost impossible to reach now.
Since the start of last season – the first with General Manager Brad Treliving having a full summer at his disposal, and the first with Head Coach Craig Berube behind the bench, Toronto ranks 27th in the NHL in shot attempt share at 5-on-5, and 22nd in expected goal (shots attempts weighted based on location and other factors) share. Both of these lie in stark contrast to the 6th and 5th respective ranks they had across 2016/17 to 2023/24, the last year being the first of Treliving’s tenure. While shot metrics aren’t the only reflection of what it takes for a hockey team to win, the league’s elite tend to be a lot closer to the top than the bottom, and a significant dip to this degree is a sign that things aren’t trending well.
Treliving’s first season, where he kept previous coach Sheldon Keefe for one more season and left most of his roster moves to the peripheral, saw some elements of decline towards the upper-middle of the league, but that decline has snowballed since. Last year’s team was a mess disguised as progress – often being outplayed in games, but getting spectacular goaltending from their tandem of Anthony Stolarz and Joseph Woll that kept them close. Removing empty-net goals, Toronto’s record in one-goal games was an astonishing 33-12-4, which is a pace that would’ve won the President’s Trophy over a full season.
In the moment, starved for a playoff run and open to the possibility of winning a different, saw these tight, often fortunate wins as a show of scrappiness and supported the run as legitimate growth, even if the results showed a very low chance of repeatability. The playoffs offered more of the same. The Leafs turned back the clock to the Battle of Ontario and beat Ottawa in six games, and then brought the Cup-winning Florida Panthers to seven – the furthest any of their opponents went.
Hidden behind the excitement of the raw results was the fact that Ottawa was one of the team’s weakest playoff opponents across the era, and only one of their four wins against them was decisive. Against Florida, after two one-goal wins to start and a strong first-period in Game 3, the Panthers outscored Toronto 18-6 in the back two-thirds of the series. Most of the games weren’t really close from a pressure perspective. Like the regular season, Toronto’s coin landed on heads a bunch in the toss games, and it brought them closer to glory than usual.
Despite all of this, the Leafs operated throughout the year with the mindset of “going for it”, perhaps knowing that forward Mitch Marner was likely out the door at the end of it. (To Treliving’s credit, he did attempt an off-ramp move with Marner at the deadline, to no avail). The team splurged on Brandon Carlo and Scott Laughton, paying Fraser Minten, a first round pick, and a fourth round pick for the former and Nikita Grebenkin and a first round pick for the latter. While both are serviceable players, it seemed troublesome to pay that much for a bottom-six forward and a defenceman that was playing #5 minutes on a rebuilding team, even with salary retention considered.
It also seemed like a continued focus on what has often trapped both Treliving and past Leafs GMs ahead of the spring – a spending of futures to acquire defence-first, non-needle-moving talent who would not address the team’s inability to push pace and keep momentum under their stars. This time felt especially curious, though, as the team looked less competitive than ever, their pick capital was especially depleted, and the young players moved both seemed on the precipice of making the league and being cheap depth options (both are in the NHL full-time this season).
After years of fans complaining that Toronto’s biggest problem was the percentage of the salary cap spent on their “Core 4” of Auston Matthews, Mitch Marner, William Nylander, and John Tavares, this summer was meant to be an opportunity for the team to spread some of that up. The salary cap was finally rising with pace, Marner was moving on, and Tavares took a 60% paycut to remain with the team. Toronto used Marner’s rights to acquire Nicolas Roy, and a fourth round pick to add Dakota Joshua, spending earmarking $6 million towards making the bottom six a more aggressive forechecking group. That, so far, has largely led to very little. They made a more interesting bet in acquiring Matias Maccelli from Utah, hoping to find some playmaking value in the 25-year-old. He’s off to a slow start, but there’s enough of an element of youth and upside to that deal that you can give it a pass.
After that though, that’s about as far as they got in trying to bolster the team. Matthew Knies’ extension took up most of the rest of the freed up money, and to his credit, he’s holding up his end of the bargain so far – that was one of the things I was worried about at the start of the year, though I still think it remains to be seen whether he’s individually capable of being a driver, or if he ends up a really good complimentary piece.
Notable in all of this is that the blue line – oft-cited as the area the team needed to spend any gained money on the most – remained by and large the same. Many felt okay with this, seeing Toronto finish 8th in goals against last year and seeing that the group was the biggest in raw size in the league. At the same time, with Woll missing the start of the season and Stolarz not being able to repeat his results under a true starter’s workload, the results has been a team that is bleeding chances and bleeding goals.
The potential for this outcome should’ve been more evident to those paying attention. The group already struggled with puck movement and mobility last season, much like many Toronto blue lines before them. Unlike many Toronto bluelines before them, almost all of them are on the wrong side of 30, and most of them are signed with term. Chris Tanev’s injuries this season have been a big blow, but relying on a soon to be 36-year-old with an injury history to hold the fort defensively was always a big risk – and one that still has five years remaining on his deal. Jake McCabe was a great add in 2022/23 and is still good now, but he’s start to slip at 32 – and has five years remaining. Oliver Ekman-Larsson and – contrary to some beliefs – Morgan Rielly are having good seasons, but at 34 and 31, they’re risks for wear and tear as the year goes on too.
On the fringes, Simon Benoit, Philippe Meyrs, and Dakota Mermis have all left a lot to be desired this year, but are easier to pivot from. What’s alarming with the rest of the group is that it’ll be difficult to cut ties with any as they become individually expendable, and all are at age, health, and/or talent levels where those possiblities are imminent.
Up front, the team is getting goals, but largely carried by it’s stars. Nylander is producing at a torrid pace out of the gate, but he’s fininshing at a 24% clip, while the team scores at an 18.2% clip with him on the ice. Tavares continues to be ageless but has much of the same thing going for him, as does Knies. Auston Matthews, currently out with an injury and having played the last two years in a way that, while still great, doesn’t feel like close to his best self, has managed to keep the puck out of his own net to the team’s best goal differential thus far.
In fact, for all we hear of Toronto’s long-standing players being the root problem, it’s by and large been the OG’s that have kept this questionably-stirred rink from going completely rancid. Using Evolving Hockey’s Goals Above Replacement model, seven of Toronto’s eight most impactful skaters this season were acquired by previous front offices, while 14 of the bottom sixteen were ones brought in over the last two seasons. Using points, shot attempts, plus-minus.. pretty much anything else, you’ll find relatively similar results.
I think many of us have been tepid to point too many fingers at Treliving or Berube to start their tenures, lest we get written off as trying to being over-critical to prop up departed staffers. Now that both are established, though, it’s probably worth looking at this and realizing it’s not working.
For all the hype of a “DNA change”, it doesn’t feel like the Leafs have done much more than lean even further into the indulgences of solutions from eras past. The early years of the post-rebuild era felt like a team that could, if done correctly, overwhelm teams with waves of speed and creativity, supplemented by a prospect pipeline developed through Toronto’s resource advantages. None of that really came to pass. At the sign of first adversity, the plan seemed to shift to getting established support players that off-set their talent’s weaknesses, rather than reinforced their strengths to form an identity.
Now, it feels like the support players – some attempting to be gritty, some attempting to be defence first, some attempting to be both, many succeeding at neither – have become the identity. The roster has been built around a romanticized idea of what playoff hockey was at some point. The gameplan on the ice appears to be a dump-and-chase team that can’t move the puck fast enough to get into a good starting position, or move themselves fast enough to get to the finish line. It feels like a team that puts itself in a position to tire itself out, relying on goalies that are used to low work loads to not get burnt out themselves.
It feels like a team that relies more than ever on their top players to carry the offensive work load, despite one just turning 35, one moving to the West Coast, and one who hasn’t looked like himself in two years – whether it’s the playstyle, the help, his own health, or a combination of all three, I’m not sure.
It all might be enough to stay “in the mix” for a little while longer, but doesn’t seem like enough to keep up with the league’s best on a consistent basis. With the age of the group and wear-and-tear of the gameplan, it’s only going to get more difficult. With the contract security of many of their underperformers, it’s difficult to see how they can pivot off of this to something different, if they even want to. Who knows what the belief level is along the ladder, from the players to Berube to Trelving to Keith Pelley to ownership.
If they want to make a big swing addition, they don’t have much left in the cupboards to spend with. If they want to re-tool, there are only a few pieces that are likely to be useful chips, and they’re likely the ones you’d want to hold onto. If they go full rebuild, well, the whole thing is over.
Maybe this is all a bit apocalyptic. Maybe it’s not enough – I’ve got more micro-concerns here but past 2000 words, I’ve almost definitely killed your own attention spans. But it just seems bleak in Toronto right now, and it’s hard to see anything but a organization that’s cornered itself into a checkmate. What a shame, given where the board was not too long ago.
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